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Cahn: Sexual Harassment on Campus

SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: DOES
THE ACCUSED HAVE ANY RIGHTS?
Richard C. Cahn ::
INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years ago, the term "sexual harassment" was
apparently unknown, and sexual harassment was not generally
recognized by the courts as an actionable form of sex
discrimination. 1 Sexual harassment emerged as a topic of public
concern during newsworthy events such as the Clarence
Thomas/Anita Hill hearings 2 and as a result of the Tailhook
incident. 3
* B.A., Dartmouth College, 1953; LL.B., Yale University, 1956.
Richard C. Calm is a former President of the Suffolk County Bar Association
and teaches as an adjunct professor at Touro Law Center. Additionally, he
represented the plaintiff in the Starishevsky case.
1. See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Phillips
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)); Willingham v. Macon
Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Sprogis v.
United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); see also Stanley S. Arkin, PotentialCriminal Sanctionsfor Sexual
Harassment, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 13, 1994, at 3 (citing Sarles, The Case of the
Missing Woman: Sexual Harassment and Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 17, 18 (1994)). By 1986, the United States
Supreme Court, in Meritbr Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986), held
that sexual harassment constitutes gender discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1995).
2. See Arkin, supra note 1, at 3; see also Emma Coleman Jordan, Race,
Gender and Social Class in the Thontas Sexual Harassment Hearings: The
Hidden FaultLines in PoliticalDiscourse, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. I (1992).
3. See CoNTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE V (2d ed.
1994); Arkin, supra note 1, at 3; Lieutenant Commander J.Richard Chema,
Arresting 'Tailhook'; The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment in the Military,
140 MiL. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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Articles have abounded about the seriousness of sexual
harassment and have even explored the possibility of criminal
sanctions for harassers. 4 Precisely because the subject is so
emotionally charged, writers have exhibited concern about the
rights and reputations of those accused of sexual harassment. 5 An
article in The New York LaWi Journalexplained:

[E]ven groundless allegations of sexual harassment, like those of
rape, can irreversibly damage reputations, ruin careers, or be
misused to obtain unduly large financial settlements from those
entities that wish to avoid negative publicity. Indeed, while
sexual harassment laws can function in some cases as a shield
against hideous acts, these laws can also be used as a means of
extortion. Combining this already substantial force with the
stigma and significant penalties attached to criminal sanction

4. See Arkin, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that "[s]ome jurisdictions have
already criminalized certain forms of sexual harassment" but noting that there
is a potential First Amendment problem with such criminal sanctions); Chema,
supra note 3, at 52 (stating that a particular military statute "is an excellent
substantive device for enforcing criminal sanctions for conduct in the nature of
hostile environment sexual harassment"); Lisa Pfenninger, Sexual Harassment
in the Legal Profession: Workplace Education and Reform, Civil Remedies,
and Professional Discipline, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 171, 213-14 (1994)
("France and Spain have imposed criminal sanctions of up to one year in
prison for workplace harassment."). But see Monica L. Sherer, Comment,
Symposium: Comment: No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under
Title IX For Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2142 (1993)
("Although criminal sanctions have the advantage of the state paying for the
prosecution, they may not be suitable for sexual harassment cases."); Russell
W. Whittenburg, Comment, Sexual Harassment: A JurisprudentialAnalysis,
10 CAP. U. L. REv. 607, 613-17 (1981) (stating that criminal sanctions would
not likely be effective against sexual harassment because society may view
them as attempts .to legislate morality).
5. See, e.g., Kathleen Murray, A Backlash on Harassment Cases, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1990. at 23.
[T]here's a very discernible effort on the part of men who are feeling
arbitrarily treated or wrongly accused to bring litigation to clear their
name... [which] is not surprising... given the stigma of the
accusation .... The assumption with sexual harassment today seems to
be that a man is guilty if he has been accused.
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could have a synergetic effect, leaving many targets of
6
accusations virtually defenseless.
The Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems,

Inc.,7 refined the statutory definition of gender discrimination by
clarifying the circumstances under which an employer may be
liable for sexual harassment of an employee. 8 In Harris, the
United States Supreme Court stated that unlawful employment
discrimination "is not limited to economic or tangible

discrimination." 9
In recent years, students and faculty members have perceived
sexual harassment to be a significant problem on university
campuses. Many institutions of higher education accept federal
financial assistance under Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972.10 The United States Department of
Education adopted regulations requiring that recipients of federal
assistance adopt regulations providing for a "prompt and

equitable"

resolution

of gender

discrimination

claims. 1 1

Typically, colleges and universities publish and distribute student
handbooks; the policies relating to sexual harassment claims and
the procedures for hearing such claims have been added to such
handbooks. A focus of such policies has been to announce clearly
6. Arldn, supra note 1,at 3.
7. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
8. Id. at 371.
9. Id. at 370 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986)). "The phrase, 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' [as used
in the statute] evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women in employment,' which includes
requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment."
Id. (quoting Vimson, 477 U.S. at 64).
10. 20 U.S.C. § § 1681, 1687 (1988). Section 1687 provides in pertinent
part: "[N]o person... shall, on the bdsis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program" of the college or university receiving such
assistance. Id.
11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1994). This regulation provides: "Complaint
procedure of recipient. A recipient shall adopt and publish grievance
procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and
employee complaints alleging any action which would be prohibited by this
part." Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1995], Art. 2

582

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

that the university will not tolerate gender discrimination. Often,
policies and procedures are written in general terms, and sexual
harassment claims have been resolved by the application of ad
hoc procedures. 12 A view is emerging that such procedures are
unfair to those accused of sexual harassment.
In an excessive effort to purge the university of sexual
corruption, many institutions have violated the rights of the
professors involved by neglecting to follow standard procedures.
Since sexual harassment is a relatively recent priority, "standard
procedures" are themselves new, shrouded, and shaky. Charges
of sexual harassment are uncharted territory, and fairness is not
13
necessarily the compass .... In The Lecherous Professor,
authors Billie Wright Dziech and Linda Weiner explain why
feminists are not concerned with due process .... For Dziech
and Weiner, academic freedom and due process are simply more
platitudes generated by the old-boy network. They dismiss any
concern about fairness with their image of the ranks of male
professionals united against the slim victim. To many feminists,
like Dziech and Weiner, who are interested in cleansing the
university of harassers, a few casualties of justice along the way
seem like a small price to pay. 14
A small number of cases have now reached the state and
federal courts, challenging the procedures and results reached in
campus sexual harassment proceedings. 15 The courts thus far
have been quite critical of the procedures employed.
12. Black's Law Dictionary defines ad hoc as "for this special purpose. An

attorney ad hoc... is one appointed for a special purpose, generally to
represent the client ... in the particular action in which the appointment is
made." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979).
13. BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS
PROFESSOR (2d ed. 1990).
14. Id. at 49. See Katie Roiphe, The Morning After: Sex, Fear and
Feminism on Campus 95-97 (Little, Brown & Co. 1993).
15. See Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994); Silva v.
University of N.H., No. CIV. 93-533-SD, 1994 WL 504417 (D.N.H. Sept.
15, 1994); Starishevsky v. Hofstra Univ., 161 Misc. 2d 137, 612 N.Y.S.2d

794 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1994). These cases give preliminary indications
that the courts are treating charges of campus sexual harassment as sufficiently
threatening to an accused's position and reputation as to warrant meaningful
procedural protections.
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Both Starishevsky v. Hofstra University16 and Silva v.
University of New Hampshire 7 concerned university employees.
Starishevsky was a psychologist who was the director of student

counseling services at Hofstra University, a private institution; 18
Silva was a tenured professor employed by the University of New
Hampshire, a state-owned and operated institution of higher
education. 19 Yusuf v. Vassar College20 concerned a charge of
sexual harassment leveled against a student at Vassar College,
which, like Hofstra, is a private institution. 2 1 In both
Starishevsky and Silva, the New York Supreme Court, Suffolk
County, and the United States District Court for the District of
New Hampshire held that the accused employee was entitled to
procedural due process protection. 22 In Yust#f, the Second Circuit
sustained that portion of the student's complaint that alleged
equal protection violations. 23 This article will detail these three
cases and conclude that specific procedures should be afforded to
the accused sexual harasser. Additionally, this article will discuss
a fourth case now pending in an Illinois county court.
I. STARISHEVSKY V. HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY
In Starishevsky, plaintiff, a psychologist employed for twentyeight years by the defendant university, saw an undergraduate
The courts have also begun to examine more closely the procedures leading
to dismissal on sexual harassment charges of public employees in the nonacademic sector. See, e.g., Hameli v. Nazario, 94-199, sl!p op. (D. Del. Sept.
2, 1994) (setting aside the termination of a medical examiner employed by the
state after charges of sexual harassment were lodged against him by a state
employee employed in his office and holding that the accused was entitled to
some measure of due process protections).
16. 161 Misc. 2d 137, 612 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1994).
17. No. CIV. 93-533-SD, 1994 WL 504417 (D.N.H. Sept. 15, 1994).
18. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 139, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
19. Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *1.
20. 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994).
21. Id. at 711.
22. Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *25; Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 138-39,
612 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
23. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715-16.
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woman for a forty-five minute counseling session. 24 Six weeks
thereafter, she sent a letter to the defendant's affirmative action
officer claiming that plaintiff had kissed her on the lips at the
close of the counseling session. 2 5 When asked to file a response,
26
the plaintiff denied the charge in all respects.
The defendant had promulgated a sexual harassment policy four
years earlier that was embodied in a pamphlet distributed on
campus. 2 7 The policy provided that sexual harassment claims
would be screened by the affirmative action officer, and if "just
cause" was found to proceed, a hearing would be conducted by a
special committee composed of certain designated members of the
university community. 28 However, in light of the affirmative
action officer's finding that there was no. evidence of sexual
29
harassment, no hearing panel was then convened.
Six months later, a former university administrator who had
been one of plaintiff's colleagues, wrote to the university lawyer
claiming that she, too, had been kissed four years earlier by the
plaintiff. 30 Her letter was "leaked" to a prominent daily
newspaper that subsequently published its contents. 31 She had not
made a formal complaint at the time of the alleged incident,
although the sexual harassment policy had already been
32
promulgated.
The defendant university reopened the proceedings against
plaintiff, publicly announced that it had found "just cause" to
proceed with a hearing, and announced that it had convened a
special panel for the purpose of hearing evidence on the current
charge. 33 However, it was learned during the post-termination
litigation that the university's president had given the panel
24. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 139, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796.

25. Id.
26. Id.

27. Id. at 140, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

139, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
139 n.1, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796-97 n.1.
139, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
139-40, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
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members a secret charge to consider plaintiffs entire record at
he should
Hofstra and to make a recommendation as to whether
34
remain at the university based upon that record.
Even before the committee began its hearings, the university's
president circulated to all members of the Hofstra community,
including the special panel members, a memorandum detailing
35
the charge against the plaintiff, who was identified by name.
Also included in the memorandum was a description of claims
then being made public by the former administrator and another
36
female administrator who was still employed by the university.
It included claims that plaintiff had kissed two former colleagues
four years earlier, claims that had never been the subject of any
formal complaint against plaintiff, and that never became a
formal part of the charge that was the subject of the committee's
hearing. 37
During the hearing, and over the vigorous objections of
plaintiff's counsel, these two women were permitted to testify
extensively about the alleged four-year-old incidents. 38 The
plaintiff was permitted to appear with his own counsel, as was
the student complainant. 3 9 The student's lawyer was permitted to
cross-examine the plaintiff.4 0 At the conclusion of the hearing,
two panel members, unbeknownst to plaintiff or his counsel,
privately interviewed a student psychology intern who had
counseled the student complainant, and reported the contents of
41
their interview to the other panel members.
Notwithstanding the broad scope of the evidence heard by the
panel, it reported to the university's president that it was unable
to reach a finding of sexual harassment. 42 However, consistent
34. Id. at 142, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
35. Id. at 140-41, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98.
36. Id. at 141, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 143, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
39. Id.
40. Id. In a letter to the panel, the student complainant's attorney likened
the proceedings to the "mad hatter's tea party."
41. Id. at 143, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
42. Id. at 144, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
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with the president's secret instructions to its members, the panel
recommended that plaintiffs employment be terminated on other
grounds. 43 The university's president concurred in the finding of
no sexual harassment, but fired plaintiff, allegedly for
"unprofessional"
conduct. 44 Plaintiff brought a special
proceeding under article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Law
46
and Rules, 4 5 seeking reinstatement and ancillary relief.
The Supreme. Court, Suffolk County, found that the plaintiff
was entitled under Title IX to procedural due process protections,
and that the university had failed to provide him "with a hearing
that came close to being fair. .

.

. "47 The court specifically held:

Under the Federal law and the Federal regulation once an
educational institution accepts federal financial assistance, such
educational institution must also accept the responsibility to
comply with Federal laws and Federal regulations concerning a
complaint of sexual discrimination and comport with our
society's notion of fair play. This court expressly holds that
under the Federal regulation an educational institution must
develop, implement and execute a hearing procedure which is
substantially fair in nature. The regulations adopted under
congressional mandate must be read to require the adoption of a
grievance procedure providing for prompt and equitable
43. Id.
44. Id. at 14445, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 800.

45. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1994). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
The only questions that may be raised in a proceeding under this article
are:
1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it
by law; or
2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to
proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure,
was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or
an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the
measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed ....
Id.

46. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 139, 147-49, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796, 80102.
47. Id. at 138, 140, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796-97.
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resolution of any complaint involving sexual discrimination, and
can only have intended to require that an educational institution
develop and implement a procedure which is fundamentally fair
48
to both the accused and the accuser.
The court expressly found that the federal regulation 4 9
mandated fairness to the accused.
These regulations clearly require the creation of a process
will provide fairness to both the accuser and the accused.
other result could have been intended by the Congress
permitted by the Office for Civil Rights in Education,
Agency charged with adopting regulations appropriate to
enforcement of the statute. 5 0

that
No
nor
the
the

48. Id. at 145-46, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (citations omitted).
49. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1994).
50. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 140, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 797. In its
decision on reargument, the Starishevsky court found further support for an
interpretation of the Title IX regulations that mandate fairness to both sides in
a sexual harassment proceeding. See OFFICE OF CIm iGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., TITLE IX GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES: AN INTRODUCTORY MANUAL 8
(1987). "Frequently, allegations of sexual harassment raise sensitive issues that
require confidentiality. If the identity of the complainant and/or the
respondents and the allegations themselves were made public prior to any
determination, serious problems for the individuals involved, as well as the
institutions could result." Id.
The Office of Civil Rights Manual asserts that grievance procedures should
be designed in order to provide equitability and due process to all parties
involved in the grievance. Id. at 9-12. Additionally, the manual states that:
The Title IX regulation requires that the grievance procedure provide
for the equitable resolution of complaints of Title IX violations. The
term "due process" has often been used to refer to one standard for the
equitability of such procedures. Due process requires simply that all
persons involved in a grievance - both the grievant and the respondent
(the party alleged to have violated Title IX requirements) - be provided
equal opportinity to present their case and to receive a fair hearing.
Equitability and due process are increased by such grievance provisions
as those which require written recording of grievances and grievance
answers, those which require notification of all involved parties with
regard to the various actions within the grievance process, those which
guarantee the right of representation to all parties and those which
guarantee grievants the rights of appeal.
Id. at 15.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1995], Art. 2

588

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

Finding that Hofstra failed to provide Starishevsky with a
hearing that comported with fundamental notions of fairness and
due process, 5 1 the court ordered Starishevsky's reinstatement
52
notwithstanding the fact that he was an "at will" employee,
holding that once Hofstra invoked its sexual harassment
procedures in an effort to determine whether plaintiff was guilty

The court found that the grievance procedure manual also imposed a
requirement of confidentiality that Hofstra had violated by circulating to the
entire campus community a memorandum from the president outlining the
charge against plaintiff, and by including the allegations then being made
against him by two other women, that were not the subject of the disciplinary
proceeding. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 142, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
51. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 138, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796. The court
further held that the hearing process was tainted before the first witness
appeared before the Panel by the distribution to its members of the
memorandum finding "just cause" to charge the plaintiff with sexual
harassment. Id. at 141, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 798. The court also found that:
It [was] significant (as well as perplexing) that [Hofstra's president]
advised the panel members that their inquiry was broader than the single
allegation of sexual harassment; that they were being asked to make a
recommendation as to Starishevsky's future employment at Hofstra and
that such recommendation need not be based solely on whether a finding
of sexual harassment was made. This panel understood it was to weigh
all facts and circumstances, including Starishevsky's ability to
effectively serve Hofstra and his prior employment record in
determining what action, if any, should be taken against Starishevsky.
Not only is this instruction from [the president] far beyond the scope
and purpose on this inquiry into a single incident of sexual harassment,
and in direct contravention of the policy guidelines, which limit the
panel's recommendations to a situation where sexual harassment has
been found to have occurred, this instruction and the true nature, scope
and purpose of the inquiry were not made known to Starishevsky.
Id. at 142, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 798. According to the court, plaintiff "could not
know that he had to be prepared to defend his entire career at Hofstra, and be
successful in that defense, to maintain his employment at Hofstra." Id.
52. Id. at 149-55, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 802-06. The court held that the federal
regulation's mandate of a "prompt and equitable" resolution of sexual
harassment complaints constituted an express exception to New York's
employment-at-will doctrine. Id. at 145, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 803. For
commentary on this aspect of Starishevsky, see Arthur J. Hamilton and Peter
A. Veglahn, Sexual Harassment and Employment-at-Will: The Intersection of
Two Policies, 45 LAB. L.J. 586 (1994).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/2

10

Cahn: Sexual Harassment on Campus

19951

SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS

of sexual harassment, and, if so, what punishment was
53
appropriate, it was bound by those procedures.
The court found that the university's sexual harassment policy
statement and its published grievance procedure created an
express limitation on what otherwise would have been an
absolute right to terminate plaintiff's at-will employment. 54 The
court stated:
Unlike the cases in which the courts have held that broad
statements of policy guidelines; enumeration of grounds for
termination; description of grievance procedure or a general
statement regarding equal employment or non-discrimination do
not necessarily constitute such an express limitation, in the case
at bar the unambiguous language of the sexual harassment policy
statement that "[a]n individual found to be guilty of sexual
harassment is subject to disciplinary action for violations of this
policy, consistent with existing procedures" and the equally
unambiguous language of the grievance procedure that "[i]f the
committee determines that the University Policy on sexual
harassment has been violated it will... make a
recormendation... for corrective disciplinary measures or
appropriate sanctions," must be read to expressly limit the
University's right to terminate the employment of an individual
accused of sexual harassment and who is processed under the
sexual harassment grievance procedure, to individuals who are
actually found guilty of the allegations of sexual harassment
lodged against such individuals.55
Looking to what it termed the "attendant circumstances," the
court found that the university was bound by its own sexual
harassment procedures and stated that "it is clear that both
Starishevsky and Hofstra understood that the inquiry was to be in
accord with the grievance procedure contained in the sexual
harassment guidelines. "56
53. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 151-52, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
54. 1d. at 150, 612 N.Y.S.2d'at 803.
55. Id. at 150-51, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 151, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 804. The court concluded that it was
"fairly inferable that upon completion of the inquiry process and a finding that
Starishevsky was not guilty of sexual harassment that Starishevsky would be
reinstated to his previous position." Id.
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Similarly, the court concluded that the university could not,
consistent with due process, rely upon information developed at
the hearing to terminate plaintiff for misconduct that had not been
specifically charged and that which he had no opportunity to
prepare a defense.
Hofstra cannot under the guise of processing a sexual harassment
complaint pursuant to its own grievance procedures, terminate
Starishevsky's employment because of a purported finding that
his behavior though not amounting to sexual harassment is
"unethical, unprofessional, and inappropriatd" undei the rules of
the American Psychological Association. Had Hofstra wished to
charge Starishevsky with conduct in violation of the American
Psychological Association rules and proceed under that
association's rules, procedures and standards, it could have and
should have done so. If Hofstra had concerns regarding
Starishevsky's credentials, judgment, professionalism and the
University's confidence in him, it could have and should have
pursued such concerns through the appropriate University
procedure. 57
In summary, the court stated that:
This court cannot permit Hofstra to process... [the] complaint
under the grievance procedures; have the panel unable to find
that plaintiff's conduct amounted to sexual harassment; have [the
president] find that [plaintiff was] not guilty of sexual
harassment, and then terminate [his] employment on grounds that
were not the basis of the inquiry and as to which [plaintiff] had
no opportunity to defend. The grievance procedures and the
federal regulations upon which they are founded provide for
disciplinary measures or appropriate sanction upon a finding of
sexual harassment. There being no such finding there can be no
58
termination of employment.

57. Id. at 152, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
58. Id. at 151-52, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
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II. SILVA V. UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
In Silva, the court, although essentially dealing with a
professor's First Amendment rights in the classroom, also
sustained a complaint alleging procedural due process violations
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 59
In March, 1992, in. the course of lecturing to his class in
technical writing, plaintiff, a tenured Instructor of
Communications at the Thompson School of Applied Science at
the University of New Hampshire, used several vivid metaphors.
He compared focusing, the thesis statement in a technical report,
to sex:
I will put focus in terms of sex .... Focus is like sex. You seek
a target. You zero in on your subject. You move from side to
side. You close in on the subject. You bracket the subject and
center on it. Focus connects experience and language. You and
the subject become one. 60.
In the same class two days later, plaintiff "used Little Egypt's
definition of belly dancing to illustrate how a good definition
combines a general classification... with concrete specifics in a
metaphor.., to bring home clearly the meaning to one who
wishes to learn this form of ethnic dancing."61 He specifically
said, "[belly dancing is like jello on a plate with a vibrator under
the plate." 62 His professorial metaphors soon brought about a
series of events that the federal court termed "informal" and
"formal" sexual harassment complaint procedures. 63
59. Silva v. University of N.H., No. CIV. 93-533-SD, 1994 WL 504417,
at *1, *23 (D.N.H. Sept. 15, 1994). The Silva court did not base its decision
on Title IX, but rather upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
(West 1994) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1995). Id. at *1. The university
defendant established sexual harassment policies relying principally upon Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Sexual Discrimination
that were issued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e (West 1995) and 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1994). Id. at *1-2.
60. Id. at *3.

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *26.
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On the date of the belly dancing statement, six female students
complained to Dr. Jerilee Zezula, an associate professor at the
64
Thompson School, about plaintiff's classroom statements.
The university's Associate Vice President for Academic
Affairs, Neil Lubow, met with Zezula and the students who had
approached her. 65 Describing the students as "very upset,"
Lubow made a decision on the spot to replace the plaintiff in the
classroom. Lubow's notes of the meeting with the students
reflected that he discussed "looking into replacement instructor(s)
for Silva." 6 6
Within the next several days, eight written complaints were
submitted by students to the university, variously describing the
complainants as "appalled," "degraded," or "demeaned" by
Silva's actions; most of these letters complained about Silva's
classroom statements. 67
Lubow summoned plaintiff to a meeting four days after he had
met with the student complainants and Zezula, and for the first
time confronted plaintiff with the students' complaints. 6 8 Plaintiff
was given no time to formulate a response. 69
Immediately following this meeting, the university "created
'shadow' classes so that any of plaintiff's students who wanted to
transfer out of his classes could do so, and plaintiff was required
to make announcements to his students offering them the
opportunity to transfer into one of the shadow classes." 70
Lubow drafted a letter of reprimand, and two weeks later
scheduled a second meeting with plaintiff. 7 1 At the subsequent
meeting, he delivered the "draft" reprimand letter, stating that
the students' reports "have been found to be altogether credible,"
and "[Silva's] behavior [was] in violation of University policy
prohibiting

sexual

harassment ...and

[would]

not

be

64. Id. at *4.

65. Id. at *6.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *5-6.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. (citing memorandum from Giles to Silva).
Id.at *8.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/2

14

Cahn: Sexual Harassment on Campus

19951

SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS

593

tolerated." 72 The draft imposed conditions for continued
employment of the plaintiff, and several weeks later, without
73
change, was converted into a formal letter of reprimand.
Plaintiff protested the reprimand letter by pursuing the
university's grievance procedures, during the pendency of which
he was suspended for failing to meet the conditions for continued
employment contained in the reprimand. 74
However, upon plaintiff's appeal from the initial denial of his
grievance, his suspension was put "into abeyance until the
grievance process [was] completed." 75 Nevertheless, Silva was
notified that he would not be scheduled to teach any classes for
the fall semester of 1992.76 Thus ended what the court termed
the "informal" sexual harassment proceedings. 77
In November 1992, plaintiff received notice from the director
of his school that a formal complaint of sexual harassment had
been filed against him, and that "because of the Panel's
responsibilities[,]" he stated that he was "rescinding the formal
letter of reprimand and the sanctions set forth therein." 78 At the
ensuing hearing, before a panel established for that purpose,
plaintiff was confronted with a number of claims, of which he
had no prior notice. 79
The panel recommended that the university's president find
plaintiff guilty of sexual harassment and impose a one year leave
without pay, and that he be required to "[r]eimburse the
university for all costs associated with any and all alterations in
teaching assignments ... [to] participate in approved counseling
sessions, [and to] [a]pologize in writing to the [students] for
creating a hostile'and offensive environment." 80 The president
concurred that plaintiff had violated the sexual harassment policy,
72. Id.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Silva's affidavit).
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *13.
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and imposed all of the recommended sanctions except that the
one-year counseling requirement "was altered to require plaintiff
to 'obtain a counseling evaluation... and, if prescribed,
participate in continued counseling sessions." 8 1
Plaintiff filed an appeal with an appeals panel, which was made
up of two students and three faculty members. 82 The hearing
lasted for more than twelve hours and was described by the
plaintiff as "chaotic." 83 The student members were eating
sandwiches, and the student witnesses were allowed to whisper
with one another and send signals to one another during their
testimony. 84 A remark that plaintiff made to his advisor was
misheard by a student complainant, who jumped up and repeated
aloud that plaintiff had made an offensive comment; whereupon
three other students jumped up and said that that was what they
had also heard. 85 This caused a "total disruption. ' 86 Shortly
thereafter, a student stood up in the middle of the hearing while a
fellow student was testifying, walked out of the room and
collapsed. 87 Plaintiff described what ensued by stating, "I'll
never forget the looks of the people on the panel. Because they
looked at her and then they looked at me as if I had caused, you
know, this effect." 88 The appeals board sustained the guilty
finding and the sanctions imposed by the president.89
The court, finding that plaintiff's classroom speech was
constitutionally protected and that the speech was a motivating
factor in the decision to discipline him, found that plaintiff was
likely to succeed upon his claim that his First Amendment rights
were violated. 90 Accordingly, plaintiff was granted a preliminary

81. Id. (quoting letter from Nitzschke to Silva).
82. Id. at *14.
83. Id. (citing Silva's affidavit).

84. Id.
85. Id.at *15.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Silva's deposition).
89. Id. at *17. See supra text accompanying note 80.
90. Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *23.
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injunction reinstating him to his position. 9 1 In addition to his
First Amendment claim, plaintiff was held to have a property
interest in his continued employment, of which he had been
deprived as a result of the sexual harassment charges. 92 The
court therefore refused to dismiss plaintiff's claim that he was
deprived of procedural due process in the conduct of the formal

sexual harassment process. 93 The court ruled that "a genuine
91. Id. at *41. The court held, aside from the irreparable harm arising
from the First Amendment violations, that "the University's suspension of
Silva without pay, which remains in effect, constitutes an independent basis for
finding that Silva has been and continues to be irreparably harmed in this
case." Id. at *34.
92. Id. at *24 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972)).
The court also stated that "[a] person's liberty interests are implicated where
the person's 'good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him.'" Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)). See Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 1994) ("An employee's liberty interests
are implicated where the employer levels accusations at the employee that are
so damaging as to make it difficult or impossible for the employee to escape
the stigma of those charges."). The court in Silva continued by stating that:
Plaintiff was charged with violating the University's sexual harassment
policy. The court finds and rules that such a charge implicates plaintiff's
liberty interests in his good name and reputation because the charge of
sexual harassment and the subsequent sanctions imposed by defendants
"might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community."
Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *24 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573). Additionally:
The court finds and rules that Silva's April 1993 suspension without pay
from his position as a tenured professor, which remains in effect today,
implicates property and liberty interests entitled to constitutional
protection. The court further finds and rules that the earlier disciplinary
sanctions, as described above, are, in the aggregate, a more than de
minimis deprivation of plaintiff's property and liberty interests in his
employment as a tenured professor at [the university].
Id. Finally, "[t]he court finds and rules that Silva was entitled to the
protections of procedural due process before the defendant University
significantly altered his employment status in the manner described herein."
Id. at *25.
93. Id. at *25. The court relied upon United States Supreme Court
authority in analyzing the procedural due process requirements. Id. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("[Due
process requires that] a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by
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issue of material fact exist[ed] as to whether Silva received
adequate notice [during the formal sexual harassment
proceedings] that incidents not mentioned in the student
complaints and incidents upon which no evidence was presented
at the hearings would be considered by the hearing panel and
appeals board." 94 Additionally, the court found that "a genuine
issue of material fact exist[ed] as to ... whether the bias of [one
member of the appeals board] compromised the impartiality and
independence of the appeals board." 95 The court noted that "an

impartial

and

independent adjudicator

'is

a fundamental

ingredient of procedural due process."96

notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.'
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950))); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is
determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is
due."); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (stating that due
process requires that a plaintiff receive adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner").
The Silva court stated that "'[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral
or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story."' Silva, 1994 WL
504417, at *25 (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546).
"'Beyond the right to notice and hearing, the span of procedural protections
required to ensure fairness becomes uncertain, and must be determined by a
careful weighing or balancing of the competing interests implicated in the
particular case.'" "Id.(quoting Gorman v. University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14
(1st Cir. 1988)).
94. Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *30.
95. Id. at *33. The court found that the essence of plaintiff's substantive
due process claim was the same as his First Amendment claim, and because
the First Amendment "'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection"' against the challenged government behavior, "his claim is best
analyzed under the First Amendment rather than under the more generalized
notion of substantive due process." Id. at *34. The court therefore granted
summary judgment to the university on plaintiff's substantive due process
claim. Id. at *38.
96. Id. at *30 (quoting Gorman, 837 F.2d at 15).
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III. YUSUF V. VASSAR COLLEGE
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit decided "important questions as to
when college disciplinary proceedings violate federal laws against
gender discrimination." 97 Plaintiff, a male student at a private
college, alleged that his roommate, James Weisman, brutally
attacked him, and that when he pressed criminal charges, the
roommate's girl friend, Tina Kapur, retaliated against him by
bringing false sexual harassment charges. 9 8 Yusuf claimed that
his being found guilty of the sexual harassment charge and
receiving a stiffer penalty for the alleged harassment than his
roommate received for his battery was an act of gender
discrimination, in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. 99
After Yusuf made a criminal complaint to the Poughkeepsie
Police Department resulting in Weisman's arrest, the College
Regulations Panel scheduled a hearing regarding the incident. 100
Prior to the hearing, both Weisman and Kapur tried to dissuade
Yusuf from pressing charges. 10 . "When Yusuf testified against
Weisman at the College Regulations Panel hearing, he was not
questioned about the alleged assault and battery, but instead about
his relationship with Kapur." 102 The panel found Weisman guilty
of the charges, but gave him only a "suspended suspension" for
the semester, so that he could complete his requirements and
3
graduate with his class. 10
Yusuf was informed that Kapur filed sexual harassment charges
against him, but was not informed "of the basis or details of the

97. Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 711 (2d Cir. 1994).
98. Id. at 712.
99. Id. at 713. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 are codified
at 20 U.S.C. § § 1681-88 (1988). Yusuf, a Bengali student, also made a race
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994), but the dismissal
of this claim was affirmed by the Second Circuit. YIusuf, 35 F.3d at 714.
100. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 712.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1995], Art. 2

598

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 11

charges." 104 Rather, he was instructed to appear at a hearing at a
specified time and place. 105 Four days before the scheduled
hearing, Yusuf was permitted to see Kapur's statement. 10 6 He
then submitted to the Chair of the College Regulations Panel a
list of twelve witnesses he wished to call. 10 7 The Chair told him,
however, "that twelve witnesses were too many and reduced the
list to seven, deleting several key witnesses in the process." 10 8
At the onset of the hearing, which began at five o'clock in the
evening, it was announced that the hearing would end promptly
at nine o'clock in the evening.10 9 Plaintiff's "difficulties in
presenting his defense were compounded by the fact that his
'most crucial' witness ...was away from campus and could not
be present for the hearing." 110 His attempt to submit a written
statement from the witness was rejected. 111
"Kapur testified that Yusuf had sexually harassed her on two
occasions." 112 She was unable, however, "to identify the dates,
other than that they occurred sometime during December
1991." 113 When plaintiff asked her to be more specific, Nichols,
the acting Chair, stated: "We are not concerned with when the
event occurred, only whether it could have occurred." 114 "The
panel then settled on December 10, 1991 as the date of one of the
incidents." 115 Plaintiff "attempted to introduce records showing
that he was confined to the college infirmary that day," but the
panel refused to allow introduction of the records. 1 16 The hearing
ended "at [nine o'clock in the evening], notwithstanding the fact
that Yusuf still had two witnesses from his approved list that had
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.at 712-13.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/2

20

Cahn: Sexual Harassment on Campus

1995]

SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS

599

not yet been called." 117 The panel found him guilty as charged
and banned him from his dormitory and suspended him from
118
college for a semester.
Plaintiff filed a federal action, claiming that Vassar
discriminated against him on account of his gender in violation of
Title IX by finding him guilty of the sexual harassment
charge. 119 The Second Circuit sustained his Title IX claim,
finding that "Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of

action for monetary damages and injunctive relief."

120

Relying upon the legislative history of Title IX and the body of
law developed under Title VII, the Second Circuit noted that:
Title IX was enacted to supplement the Civil Rights Act of
1964's bans on racial discrimination in the workplace and in
universities. Because the statutes share the same goals and
because Title IX mirrors the substantive provisions of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts have interpreted Title IX by
looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as
the caselaw interpreting Title VII. 121

The court found no reason to doubt the basic proposition that
"Title IX bars the imposition of university discipline where
gender is a motivating factor in the decision to discipline." 122
The court went on to hold that, in Yusuf's case, "the complaint

117. Id. at713.
118. Id.
119. Id. Yusuf's complaint alleged that: "Defendant has historically and
systematically rendered verdicts against males in sex[ual] harassment cases,

solely on the basis of sex ....Male respondents in sex[ual] harassment cases
at Vassar College are discriminated against solely on the basis of sex. They are
invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence, or lack thereof." Id.
120. Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
121. Id. (citation omitted). See Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges
& Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316-17 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 849 (1987); Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F.
Supp. 345, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
122. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2(m) (West 1994) ("[An unlawful employment practice is established
when... sex... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.").
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alleges events that, if proven, would support an inference of
discrimination." 12 3
IV. SNYDER V. CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY: ANOTHER CASE TO WATCH
A case involving a claim that campus disciplinary proceedings
arising out of allegations of sexual harassment violated the rights
of the accused is now pending in the Illinois courts. In Snyder v.
Chicago Theological Seminary, 124 a tenured professor and
former dean on.the faculty of the Chicago Theological Seminary
alleged that he was a person of good name, fame, and repute in
the community and was deservedly held in high esteem by and
among his acquaintances, students, professional colleagues and
the general public. 12 5 In March, 1992, during a lecture to his
Synoptic Gospels class, he told a story from the Talmud having
sexual references.126 A female student complained to the
academic dean that Snyder had told an extremely offensive story
in violation of the Seminary's sexual harassment policy. 127
A female faculty member publicly announced during a chapel
service that five years earlier, that plaintiff had hugged her "in a
deeply inappropriate way." 12 8 At or about the same time, a
123. Id. at 715-16.

124. No. 94 L 01423 (Circuit Court of Cook County, 111. filed Aug. 30,
1994). Snyder and Silva were described in Kenneth Jost, Questionable
Conduct, 80 A.B.A. J. 71, 71-75 (Nov. 1994).
125. Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at 2, Snyder v. Chicago
Theological Seminary, No. 94 L 01423 (Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill.
filed Feb. 17, 1995).
126. Id.

127. Id. The Chicago Theological Seminary had adopted a sexual
harassment policy defining the offense as including "verbal conduct of a sexual

nature" with "the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work or academic performance or creating an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive working or academic environment." Id. at 3. Application
of this policy to ihe contents of Snyder's class lecture should be found to
implicate the same First Amendment rights that formed the underpinning of
Silva.
128. Id.at 3.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss3/2

22

Cahn: Sexual Harassment on Campus

19951

SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS

601

female staff member complained that the plaintiff had rubbed up
against her in the copy room. 129 Neither the hug nor the copy
room incident were ever made the subject of charges against the
plaintiff. 130
About nine months after the offending classroom lecture,
plaintiff was summoned to a meeting of the sexual harassment
task force. 131 He was specifically told that the meeting was

"nothing" and "not to worry about it."132 He was "deliberately"
not advised to bring counsel and was "deliberately" not presented
with either a formal charge or a copy of the letter written by the
student complaining about his classroom conduct. 133 He was
asked to write a letter saying that he never intended to abuse
anyone. 13 4 Although he objected, he agreed to do so for the good
of the community.135 At this meeting, the task force "considered
136
dismissing plaintiff as a disciplinary option."
One month later, he was summoned to another task force
meeting and again "deliberately" not advised to bring counsel
and was "deliberately" not presented with a formal or informal
charge. 137 At this meeting, he was asked to write another letter
stating that he knew what sexual harassment meant and that he
never intended to harass anyone. 138 Plaintiff also objected to
writing this letter, stating that his academic freedom was being
impaired, but he did so after being implored to do so for the sake
13 9
of peace in the community.
Two months later, he was summoned to a third meeting of the
task force and was handed a copy of a memorandum entitled
"Formal Complaint Against Graydon Snyder." 140 In the
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.

132. Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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memorandum, it was stated that the task force "has found that
Dr. Graydon Snyder engaged in verbal conduct of a sexual
nature" that violated the sexual harassment policy. 14 1 The
memorandum also stated that the task force "has issued" plaintiff
a formal reprimand. 142 Shortly thereafter copies of the
memorandum were placed in the mail boxes of approximately
250 faculty members, staff, and students of the Seminary. 143
Plaintiff commenced an action in the Illinois State court
alleging defamation and claiming personal humiliation and mental
anguish. 144 He also claimed that the Seminary had incorporated
into its disciplinary manual the American Association of
University Professors Statement on Procedural Standards in
Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, and that it had violated numerous
of its provisions, including the requirement of notice of the
charges "with reasonable particularity," sufficient time to prepare
a defense, notice of the procedural rights to be afforded to the
accused faculty member, the right to the assistance of counsel,
and the right to question all witnesses. 145 Snyder's complaint
expressly alleged that he was never provided with a copy of the
formal charge.1 46 Citing reckless disregard of his rights by
depriving him of his procedural rights, and by publishing the
offending memorandum "to a vastly greater number of people
than necessary or appropriate," 147 Snyder sought compensatory
and punitive damages for defamation. 148

141. Id.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 5.
144. Id. at 6-10.
145. Id. at 6-7.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id. at 9-10. This allegation is similar to Starishevsky's allegation
sustained by the court that the university breached its duty of confidentiality by
disseminating a memorandum about the charge to the entire Hofstra
community. See supranote 50 and accompanying text.
148. Second Amended Complaint for Plaintiff at 10, Snyder, No. 94 L
01423.
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Starishevsky is significant in holding that an employee of a
private university accepting federal Title IX assistance is entitled,
under federal and state law, to substantial fairness in campus
administrative proceedings convened to ascertain his guilt or
innocence of a sexual harassment charge. 14 9 In the words of the
Starishevsky court, "[t]he process of eliminating sexual
harassment must go forward with recognition of the rights of all
involved and without the creation of new wrongs. The process
must be propelled by a sense of fairness and not motivated by
any other less appropriate notions." 150 Essential elements of such
fairness include: fair notice of the specific claim lodged against
the accused; the giving of a charge to the hearing panel that
clearly limits it to a consideration of that claim; exclusion in such
proceedings of evidence unrelated to the specific claim so that the
hearing panel is untainted by other claims of misconduct; the
opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, necessarily requiring
that no evidence relating to the charged claim be received outside
of the presence of the charged employee; and a restoration of the
employee to the status quo if his guilt is not established to the
satisfaction of the panel.
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit had no occasion to make a
determination as to whether the regulation adopted under Title
IX, 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b), created due process rights independent
of gender discrimination claims, an issue ruled upon in the
affirmative by the Starishevsky court. But it is of particular
significance that in Yusuf, the Second Circuit strongly implied
that Congress' intent not to interfere with the independence of
universities assumed that student discipline would be an
outgrowth of a "fair hearing" 151 - the same conclusion that the
152
Starishevsky court reached.
149. Starishevsky v. Hofstra Univ., 161 Misc. 2d 137, 145-46, 612
N.Y.S.2d 794, 800 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1994).
150. Id. at 138, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
151. Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). The court
held: "We do not believe that Congress meant Title IX to impair the
independence of universities in disciplining students against whom the evidence
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Silva is significant because the court did not hesitate to rule that
sexual harassment charges implicate a person's "liberty interests
in his good name and reputation because the charge of sexual
harassment and the subsequent sanctions imposed by defendants
'might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community."' 15 3 The court also ruled that due process requires
adequate notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to defend a
sexual harassment charge, as well as an unbiased campus
tribunal. 154 It found irreparable harm in plaintiffs suspension
155
without pay, which was continuing at the time of its decision.
The Silva court brought campus sexual harassment procedures
squarely within the rubric of other disciplinary proceedings
involving public employees, 156 and found campus sexual
harassment procedures to be violative of the First Amendment as
applied to classroom speech.157
These three cases show a growing recognition by the courts of
procedural rights that ought to be enjoyed by those accused of
sexual harassment. They also suggest that campus procedures to
determine sexual harassment claims can easily be devised to
avoid or minimize the possibility of legal challenge. As obvious

of an offense, after a fair hearing, is overwhelming, absent a claim of selective
enforcement." Id.
152. Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 145, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 800 (stating that
"New York law requires that a university's decision to discipline a faculty
member (or a student) be predicated on [fair procedures]").
153. Silva v. University of N.H., No. CIV. 93-533-SD, 1994 WL 504417,
at *24 (D.N.H. Sept. 15, 1994) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 573 (1972)).
154. Id. at *36.
155. Id. at *35.
156. Id. at *36. This aspect of the court's decision is consistent with Hameli
v. Nazario, 94-199, slip op. (D. Del. Sept. 2, 1994). For more detail of this
case, see supra note 15.
157. Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *19. The court stated "that the
[university's] Sexual Harassment Policy as applied to Silva's classroom speech
is not reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical purpose of providing a
congenial academic environment because it employs an impermissibly
subjective standard that fails to take into account the nation's interest in
academic freedom." Id. at *21.
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as these procedural safeguards seem, a useful purpose might be
served by setting them out here.
The principal provisions of such procedures should be: receipt
of specific notice of the particulars of the charge or charges
against which the accused is expected to defend 158 and limitation
of the ensuing proceedings to those specific charges; 159 specific
notification as to the range of penalties that could be imposed
should the charge be sustained; delineation of the procedural

appeal remedies available, if any; careful selection of an impartial
panel to hear the charge, whose members need not be, and
perhaps should not be, employed by or otherwise closely
associated with the university; 160 strict instructions to the panel
members not to hear any evidence or receive any information
bearing upon the charge outside of the presence of the

accused; 161 granting the accused a reasonable opportunity to

158. See id. at *25. Setting out the most basic elements of due process, the
Silva court noted that "'[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.'" Id. (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)).
159. See, e.g., Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 146, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
The Starishevsky court concluded that the accused had not received a fair
hearing. Id. at 146, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01. The court pointed out that the
hearing panel was instructed to consider allegations other than the single
allegation of harassment upon which the hearing was based, contrary to notice
sent to Starishevsky. Id. Also contrary to what Starishevsky had been told, the
hearing panel was to consider his future employability and make
recommendations that were not solely based on the harassment claim. Id.
Finding this aspect of the hearing unfair, the court reasoned that "Starishevsky
could not know that he had to be prepared to defend his entire career at
Hofstra .... ." Id. at 142, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
160. See, e.g., Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *32 (finding a "genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the bias of [an appeals board member]
compromised the impartiality and independence of the Appeals Board on which
she sat so that Silva was not afforded a fair hearing").
161. See, e.g., Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 143, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
Two panel members conducted a post-hearing interview of a witness that lasted
about one hour. Id. The Starishevsky court found that "this private interview
without the knowledge of Starishevsky and without the opportunity for crossexamination cannot be viewed as innocuous." Id.
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prepare a defense; 162 allowing the accused meaningful assistance
of counsel1 63 and the opportunity to question witnesses and
introduce documentary evidence; 164 making and preserving an
accurate hearing record; strict adherence to the procedural rights
162. See, e.g., Silva, 1994 WL 504417, at *26. Silva claimed that he was
called to a meeting and compelled to respond to sexual harassment charges
with only the prior notice that some students had complained about his class;
therefore, he had no reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense. Id. The court
adduced conflicting evidence on this issue. Id. Although the court ruled that
Silva had been given a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense, the court
deemed it important to note that Silva was subjected to the limited deprivation
of the creation of stigmatizing "shadow classes" for those wishing to
withdraw. Id. at *28. Thus, in balancing the sufficiency of process received
against the nature of the deprivation, the court reasoned that Silva was allowed
to continue teaching and received full pay after this informal hearing which
preceded a formal hearing. Id.
163. See, e.g., Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 141, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
The Starishevsky court foufid procedural impropriety where the panel received
a "just cause" memorandum indicating Starishevsky's hearing was being
reopened because two similar incidents were alleged. Id. Furthermore, the
memorandum endorsed the accusers' credibility. Id. The court pointed out that
"[t]his was done without discussion with Starishevsky's counsel who thus, had
no opportunity to be heard on the appropriateness of disseminating such
memorandum." Id.
164. See, e.g., Yusuf, 335 F.3d at 712. Yusuf provides a striking example of
a denial of such fair procedure. Yusuf submitted that he wished to call twelve
witnesses, however, he was told that twelve was too many and that he could
only call seven. Id. The hearing proceeded with Yusuf's key witness
unavailable to testify, as the witness was away from the campus at the time.
Id. Yusuf offered a statement from this unavailable key witness which, in the
words of the court, "totally discredited" his accuser; however, it was not
admitted, as the panel noted it would not be subject to cross-examination. Id.
Yusuf was limited to a four-hour hearing. Id. When Yusuf asked his accuser to
be more specific about the date of the alleged incident, he was told by the
panel that it was not concerned with when the event occurred, but whether it
could have occurred. Id. The panel then settled on a date. Id. Yusuf was not
allowed to enter records showing that he was confined to a college infirmary
on the date of the alleged incident. Id. The hearing ended promptly after
Yusuf's four hours had expired, notwithstanding the fact that he still had two
more witnesses to call. Id at 713. The court found that "[tihe allegations
concerning the circumstances surrounding the charge... and the conduct of
the disciplinary proceeding sufficiently put into question the correctness of the
outcome of that proceeding." Id. at 716.
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previously provided to the accused; 165 and, perhaps, most
important of all, strict adherence to confidentiality on the part of
all participants in the process, which necessarily includes refusal
to make any statements to the press or media, and abstinence
from the making of any substantive statement to the campus
community regarding the charge. 166
Should an accused sexual harasser be found guilty after a
college or university has adhered to the foregoing simple rules, it
is difficult to imagine that a court would thereafter lightly set
aside disciplinary action.

165. See, e.g., Starishevsky, 161 Misc. 2d at 145, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
Making this point, the Starishevsky court stated:
It is a matter of essential fairness in the somewhat one-sided relationship

between the institution and the individual that when a university has
adopted a rule or guideline establishing a disciplinary procedure, that
such procedure be substantially observed and that in conducting the
inquiry, the university must proceed in good faith.
Id.
166. See, e.g., id. at 142, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 798. The Starishevsky court
noted that Hofstra's sexual harassment procedural guidelines require
confidentiality for all members of the campus community in the hearing
process. Id. The court found that Hofstra made no attempt to respect
Starishevsky's privacy, referring to a memorandum issued to the "Hofstra
University Community" concerning the charges. Id. The memorandum
referred to the incident in detail. Id.
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